Portfolio Gaël Rohr 21.04.2025

My knowledge of this course could be considered moderate due to my understanding of the grand strategy of some countries and others not. I consider myself able to understand the grand strategy of countries such as the US and Russia but ignore the grand strategy and objectives of countries such as Brazil or Iran. I consider myself to have a lack of theoretical knowledge relative to grand strategy. I am familiar with documents such as national security strategies but not with the theoretical background of grand strategy. My objectives for this class would be to understand the theoretical aspects of grand strategies and to learn how countries shape their grand strategies related to their diplomatic, economic, and military power.
Regarding the skills area, I have learned from my group from the last semester to have a good organization to work. It would be a challenge to do a portfolio individually and to do a presentation with a group of new members with whom I have never worked before. I consider to have improved my organizational skills, which would be vital for doing a portfolio alone. I personally lack skills in terms of using software and hope to improve this weakness. I consider myself not to be very confident when using software in general.

 

Strengths
• Hard-working: Able to commit significant effort toward achieving goals.
• Consistent: Reliable in maintaining steady effort over time.
• Knowledgeable in Grand Strategy: Existing familiarity with key concepts and theories.
• Curious: Motivated to explore new ideas deeply.
• Passionate: Genuine enthusiasm and intrinsic motivation toward the subject.
⚠️ Weaknesses
• Disorganized: Challenges in managing tasks and information efficiently.
• Stressed: Experiencing significant pressure impacting productivity.
• Lack of concentration: Difficulty maintaining focus on prolonged tasks.
• Lack of experience: Limited practical exposure to applying theories.
• Software skills: Insufficient understanding of relevant research tools/software.
🌱 Opportunities
• Expand theoretical knowledge: Opportunity to deepen understanding and expertise in Grand Strategy.
• Explore influential thinkers: Access to significant works by key intellectuals in the field.
• Collaboration: Possibility to work with peers and mentors, enhancing team and interpersonal skills.
• Support thesis research: Opportunity to align course learning directly with thesis research goals.
🚩 Threats
• Overloaded schedule: Heavy workload from multiple classes reduces focus and productivity.
• Reading demands: Difficulty in covering extensive reading materials due to competing priorities.
• Time constraints: Limited available time complicates comprehensive learning and quality research.
• Reliance on others: Inability to fully control peers’ contributions, potentially impacting presentation quality.
er and how we can contribute to your success.

Week 2-3 Biscop, S., Grand Strategy in 10 words, Bristol. Bristol University Press, 2021, chapter 1 and 2 summaries
Chapter 1 Simple but not easy
This chapter states that a grand strategy should be clear, concise, and simple to implement. It also requires excellent communication and discipline during its application. Clausewitz and Churchill emphasized that great ideas inspire actions and enable adaptability to new challenges.
The functions of grand strategies are to react to new events, to communicate with both adversaries and allies, and to set an agenda with recommended actions

Chapter 2 Competitive, the others have a strategy too.
Countries with grand strategy live in an anarchic world that is very competitive. The main goals of states are to push for their interests in order to gain resources, influence, access to new markets, and ensure the security of their respective countries. Successful grand strategies enable the state to use their military, diplomatic and economic capabilities to balance short-term responses with long-term goals established in the grand strategy.
Key points are: Simplicity fosters coherence and adaptability, strategic competition requires a degree of flexibility and foresight, Grand strategy adapts aligns ends, ways, and means to secure vital interests. These principles emphasize adaptability and clarity as central elements for the implementation of a successful grand strategy.

Week 4 Biscop, S., Grand Strategy in 10 words, Bristol. Bristol University Press, 2021, chapter 4 summary
Alliance is essential to sustain the power and influence of a nation. A state should establish partnerships with other states to maintain its power and implement the grand strategy. States that are allied have different interests, and that can be a risk for reaching its end goals. Allies can appear or disappear according to their interests. An example could be the alliance between the US_ and the Soviet Union during WWII, which became an adversary during the Cold War. Sometimes, alliances are made with countries who do not share the same ethical concerns.
An alliance should balance between maintaining national autonomy and relying on its allies for its defense and economic interests. Overdependence can create vulnerabilities, while too much autonomy can weaken a state's global position. States should reassess alliance goals in relation to new geopolitical challenges. National priorities between states can be different. It is vital to engage in negotiations to maintain cohesion. Countries should engage themselves in strategic foresight to anticipate change in the global balance of power and adjust alliance goals if necessary.

Week 5 on Gilchrist, M. (2016). Why Thucydides still matters. The Strategy Bridge Comment
This article by Mark Gilchrist reflects the usefulness of Thucydides's book about the history of the Peloponnesian War in today's world. This book, written in the 5th century BC, is still important. I believe that the state still reflects an imaginative construction created by human nature and that political infighting can lead to war. Fear, honor, and interests are still part of human nature and are the reasons for the launch of today’s wars throughout the world. The history of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates how human nature is and what are the ultimate objectives. Thucydides represents a realist vision of the world that is closely and undistinguishably from the core of human nature. The author makes a point about the use of power and shows that the power that states hold should be used carefully by implementing a sound grand strategy with clearly established goals and clear steps on how to attain them. Mark Gilchrist has used the example of the misuse of the newly acquired power by Athens, which has caused countless moral and military defeats. There is this example of how Athens has decided to crush a neutral polity, such as Melos, because they could with the famous quote: The strong do what they have to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept. Athens has failed to understand the continuity of wars.
The reaction of the Athenian culture after its defeat in Pylos shows its immaturity. Athens's strategists were unable to reflect rationally on their defeat and were more concentrated on preparing for vengeance instead of achieving peace with Sparta, which would not have cost Athens a total defeat after the battle of Syracuse. The collective morality of the state population can change according to the choice of policies that the state can make. The fall of morality after a defeat can be seen when nazi German troops have committed countless of war crimes against the civilian populations in occupied territories. In general, strategic planning was done in an impulsive way on the Athenian side, whereas it was methodically prepared on the Spartan side.
The relationship between the dominant power and the rising power and the probability of conflicts have been countlessly studied have been studied by modern realist thinkers such as Dale Copeland, John Mearsheimer, and Kenneth Waltz. These authors have been inspired by Thucydides' work to understand how a superpower reacted to the rise of a revisionist power and the factors that would lead them to go to war. Fear, honor and interests seem to have their importance in today’s world still. The only difference between today and the era of the Peloponnesian war is that superpowers tend not to fight directly due to the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The existence of these weapons has created a much more cautious approach to the ways to achieve strategic means than before WWII. Superpowers tend to rely more on proxy wars to attain their goals, and examples could be the Korean and Vietnam wars, where both sides were supported by the USA, the USSR, and China.

 

Week 6 Biscop, S., Grand Strategy in 10 words, Bristol. Bristol University Press, 2021, chapters 6. Summary
This chapter emphasizes that the Grand strategy is not a rigid plan that has the goals to align means, ways, and ends but also requires creativity due to unforeseeable events. An effective grand strategy involves combinative elements of innovative instruments and flexible thinking, and there is sometimes the need to redefine the goal. This chapter warns against institutions with extensive bureaucracies, such as the EU and NATO, that can undermine capabilities to create innovative solutions. There are also discussions on how strategic education should aim to achieve the art of creative problem-solving. Strategy is both an academic discipline and a process that adaptability and structured knowledge. Increasing resources cannot allow a strategist to attain the ends of a grand strategy. Innovation and adaptability are key components of the process of the grand strategy. True strategic talents require both knowledge and intuition. People working in this field should learn from historical lessons.
An example of creativity could be the establishment of the Marshall Plan and NATO to counter the influence of the Soviet Union. Here, the vast economic power of the USA is used as an aid that would allow the US to increase its impact on the countries that have accepted the Marshall Plan and avoid the spread of communism in this country.

Week 7 Biscop, S., Grand Strategy in 10 words, Bristol. Bristol University Press, 2021, Chapter 7. summary
Sven Biscop emphasized that strategy needs stability and that it needs to be adaptable to new events that can happen. Agility is the key to any grand strategy, and it should be aligned with the end goal of the grand strategy policy. There is a need for a good bureaucrat to implement good decisions. Moreover, there is a need to have a leader who is able to understand the main interests of the nation and not only pursue their personal goals. A grand strategy needs to be constantly readjusted, and the leader of a country should be able to abandon policies of the past.
A good chain of command is vital for agility in great strategy. It includes the bureaucracy, military, and political entities. Decisions to implement it must come from the top, and the leader must act with decisiveness. At the same time, patience is an element within the adaptability that should be taken into account. Policymakers should be patient; otherwise, the strategy would become inefficient and would lead to confusion. An example could be the mishandling of Libya due to the premature abandonment by Western allies after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime.

 

Week 8 Balzacq, T. and Ramadan-Alban, W. (2019) ‘Iran’ in Balzacq, T., Dombrowski, P. &
Reich, Comparative Grand Strategy. A framework and cases. Oxford. Oxford University Press summary
Iran is a pivotal state due to its strategic oil and gas reserves. Its grand strategy oscillates between ideological commitments and economic imperatives. Iranian grand strategy is driven by a constant quest for sovereignty and independence, shaped significantly by domestic factions competing for influence and defining national interests differently. Iran's grand strategy relies on the defense of its sovereignty and its independence due to its historical experiences with countries such as Russia, the UK, and the USA. its goal is to maintain an equilibrium (Tavazon). Ideologically, Iran promotes Islamic principles externally and internally. However, economic pragmatism prevails to support the Iranian welfare state and for protecting the Islamic regime. This dynamic creates continuous internal tension between factions, influencing domestic and international policies. Furthermore, Iran has supported a network of proxies to influence and protect its strategic depth through its concept of offensive defense. Factors that affect Iran's grand strategy are the international and regional environment, internal factional power balance, and economic imperatives.

Week 9 Franco, M. (2021), Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it, Security Policy Brief No. 133, Brussels, Egmont Institute  Cornell method
Cues & Key Points Notes & Detailed Information
Historical Evolution - 1989-1991: Collapse of Soviet Union, positive stance toward the West.
- 1995 (Primakov Doctrine): Shift toward a new active foreign policy in rejection with the unipolar world,
- 2007 (Putin's Munich Speech): Explicit rejection of US- liberal dominated world order, warning on NAT membership to Georgia and Ukraine

Core Strategic Principles - Realist approach: Driven by power and national interest,
- Hybrid warfare: Integrated use of military, economic, cyber, informational, and political instruments (Gerasimov Doctrine).
- Multipolarity: Advocates reducing US dominance globally and the emergence of subregional blocs. Membership of BRICS, OTSC, OCS, EEU

Strategic Regions - Post-Soviet Space: sustain its influence in its near-
- Balkans: Prevent EU/NATO expansion through political and military interference (Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia).
- MENA Region: Strategic partnerships (Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Syria); significant military presence in Syria. Opportunism when there are hesitations of Western powers

Implementation Methods - Military force: Direct and proxy interventions.
- Economic and energy leverage: Energy resources as a geopolitical tool.
- Information warfare: Disinformation campaigns, electoral interference (RT, Sputnik).

Economic and Domestic Constraints - Economic weakness: Over-dependence on oil/gas, limited diversification, GDP comparable to the Benelux or Italy in USD
- Domestic challenges: Declining public support due to economic stagnation and corruption, political repression, and increased authoritarianism.

Western Response Options 1. Passive Containment
- Maintain current policies without escalation

2. Active Containment
- Aggressive measures to counter Russian influence (NATO expansion, increased military presence); higher risk of escalation and confrontation.

3. Gradual Synchronized Relaxation
- Pragmatic recognition of Russia’s interests, seeking economic and strategic cooperation, but it would require mutual concessions.

Recommendations for Western Policy - Coordination of EU-US policies.
- Define common European interests.
- Balance strategic competition with pragmatic cooperation to avoid pushing Russia closer to China.
Marc Franco outlines Russia's grand strategy to restore its global power status and secure dominance in its near-abroad region. From initial cooperation with foreign minister Kozyrev, Russia's foreign policy became more assertive under the leadership of foreign minister Evgeny Primakov. Under Putin, Russia employs a realist, uses a multipolar framework, and uses hybrid warfare tactics to destroy Western unity. It strategically intervenes in its near abroad, in the Balkans, and the MENA region to counter Western influence. Internally, Russia faces significant economic vulnerabilities and rising domestic opposition. Franco discusses three potential Western responses: passive containment (maintaining status quo), active containment (aggressive counter-measures), and gradual synchronized relaxation (pragmatic cooperation). He recommends greater coordination among Western policies, a common definition of EU interests, and a careful diplomatic engagement to prevent pushing Russia further into a strategic alliance with China.

 

Week 10 The world China wants: How power will and won’t reshape Chinese Ambitions summary
Under Xi Jinping, China's rise is driven by authoritarian governance with the ACGT model (consumerism, global ambitions, and technological innovation) . The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks internal control, economic prosperity, international influence, and technological dominance, mainly through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and global 5G expansion. China increasingly uses historical narratives, emphasizing its role in World War II and traditional Confucian ethics, to legitimize global leadership ambitions and its authoritarian systems.
Domestically, Xi's rule represents a significant authoritarian turn, stifling previous trends toward limited openness, suppressing dissent, and extensively employing surveillance technologies and a return to Maoist dialectic. Internationally, China's assertive, often confrontational diplomacy, highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic, undermines its soft power because of its lack of transparency. Human rights issues, especially the repression of Uighurs and Hong Kong and assertiveness toward Taiwan, further damage its global soft-power
China's vision for a new global order emphasizes national sovereignty, economic development tailored to Chinese interests, and technological standards reflecting its dominance. However, internal contradictions such as demographic pressures, political rigidity, and tensions between global connectivity and authoritarian control pose significant challenges. Ultimately, China's primary obstacle to sustained global influence is not external resistance but its internal authoritarianism, limiting broader global acceptance of its emerging international model.

Week 11 Tellis, A. J. (2021, 3 March). Non-Allied Forever: India’s Grand Strategy According to
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Cornell method
Cue & Key Points Detailed Notes
Main Concept India's grand strategy emphasizes strategic autonomy, based on non-alignment and multi-alignment.
Strategic Autonomy - Pursues an independent foreign policy
- Avoids permanent alliances; instead, India selectively engages with various global powers.
- Aims to benefit from great powers rivalries
Foreign Policy Principles - Pragmatic and interest-driven (Realpolitik).
- Flexible diplomacy, adapting to shifting international circumstances.

Approach to Major Powers - Balances relations among key global actors (U.S., Russia, China).
- Maintains strategic flexibility without committing to formal alliances.
- creation of a multipolar world at the advantage of India
Relations with China - Realist, pragmatic response to China's aggressive behavior.
- Enhances partnerships ( Quad, BRICS) while managing direct bilateral tensions with antagonistic countries
- Avoids direct confrontation but advocates for strengthening deterrence capabilities.
India-US Relationship - Deepening strategic cooperation but no formal alliance.
- Cooperation based on the convergence of US-Indian interests against China
- Collaboration with the US is sought while independent decision-making is maintained.
Insights from "The India Way"
- Leaving traditional Indian self-absorption isolationism to become a global player that would act in its own way in the context of the Chinese threat
- Denouncing the fixation with dogma is intended to encourage India to think more pragmatically about its strategic choices
- to leave the traditional risk-aversion that has characterized Indian foreign policy and pursue a bolder foreign policy that relies on punchy actions for big rewards. The 1998 nuclear test is an example of an assertive foreign policy action that cemented India's status as a nuclear great power.
Ashley J. Tellis highlights Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s articulation of India's grand strategy as outlined in his book The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World. India's approach is rooted in strategic autonomy and pragmatic multi-alignment, carefully balancing relations with great powers without entering formal alliances. India's diplomatic flexibility is a core strength to maximize national benefits without being entrapped in direct conflicts. Relations with China and the U.S. illustrate this nuanced approach, engaging in selective strategic cooperation to counter China without entering into a US strategic dependence. Jaishankar emphasizes honest internal discourse, political dexterity, and realistic self-assessment to effectively manage India’s evolving global role.

Week 12 Fiott, D. & Simon, L. (2019) ‘The European Union’ in Balzacq, T., Dombrowski, P. &
Reich, Comparative Grand Strategy. A framework and cases. Oxford. Oxford
University Press. summary
The EU is unique among supranational organizations for its ability to formulate a coherent grand strategy, encompassing foreign, security, economic, trade, and diplomatic policies. Unlike unitary states, the EU strategy involves complex interactions among its institutions and member states. It involves the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European External Action Service(EEAS). The EU's strategic objectives come from its historical past. The EU aimed at promoting an international liberal order through common values such as democracy, the respect of human rights, and the rule of law. There is an emphasis on security in neighbouring European countries and a promotion of global stability. The EU aimed to use its vast single market to enhance its power. The EU operationalizes its grand strategy through humanitarian aid, development assistance, and the launch of peacekeeping operations. However, there are challenges between European agencies in writing and implementing the EU grand strategy. Rules of consensus and bureaucracies between European institutions led to a lack of practical capabilities.

Week 13 Milani, C.R.S. & Nery, T. (2019) ‘Brazil’ in Balzacq, T., Dombrowski, P. & Reich,
Comparative Grand Strategy. A framework and cases. Oxford. Oxford University
Press.
Chapter 7 explores Brazil’s grand strategy during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Historically, Brazil’s defense and foreign policy were separated, due to tensions between the military and diplomatic apparatus, causing strategic incoherence. The authors argue that Brazil's first genuine attempt at a comprehensive grand strategy occurred under the Workers' Party (PT), combining autonomy, soft and hard power, and regional and global aspirations.
Regionally, Brazil led integration initiatives like MERCOSUR and UNASUR to position South America as a global power bloc. Despite significant military capabilities, structural budget limitations restricted Brazil’s regional and global power projection. Brazil pursued a multipolar vision globally, emphasizing South–South cooperation and engagement with the BRICS. Development cooperation and participation in peacekeeping missions, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, illustrated its expanding global ambitions. Tensions between the pro-American industrialist and national developmentalists led to the incoherent implementation of the Brazilian grand strategy.
However, Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 halted this strategic project, dismantling its autonomous foreign policy. Future grand strategy efforts require consensus on national development, improved civil-military relations, more substantial strategic planning, and better integration between defense, industrial, educational, and foreign policies, ensuring democratic accountability and effective regional and global engagement.

Grand Strategy in War and Peace by Paul Kennedy
What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush by Hal Brands
On War by Carl von Clausewitz
Foundations of Geopolitics by Alexander Dugin
The Indian Way by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar

 

International relations and the 2 Koreas , by Dr Tongfi Kym 25.03.2025
This conference, held by Dr. Tongfi Kym, was about the history and reasons for the division of the Korean peninsula. He first provided a historical background on the reasons for the peninsula's division, starting from the occupation of the Korean peninsula in 1910 to today. He then continued to explain the different political regimes between the North and the South and who their major backers were. He began to trace the partnership between North Korea and the Soviet Union in the 1948 mutual defence treaty. The treaty was terminated in 1996 after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Dr. Kym then acknowledges North Korea as a traditional exporter of troops during the Cold War era. North Korean troops were sent to the Vietnam War, in the Somali and Ethiopian wars, and in the Iraq-Iran War. Engagement could be linked with ideologies such as anti-Americanism. Other reasons could be linked to agreements with one of the parties to the conflict to receive cash, fuel, and food. He also acknowledges that North Korean troops always fight in wars where they are not on the losing side. He then makes a parallel with the engagement of North Korea in Russia’s camp in the war against Ukraine. He believes that Russia can assist North Korea in its nuclear sector, in the improvement of its ballistic missile program, and in the improvement of North Korean submarines. Dr. Kym also indicated that Russia's improvement of North Korean military capabilities would increase the threat against Seoul. One of the goals of North Korea in this partnership is to create the perception of possessing advanced weapons and thus cement its status as a nuclear power. He also declares that the concept of balance of power does not matter due to the vast superiority of American, South Korean, and Japanese armies. He then also claimed that North Korean soldiers were caught unaware that they would fight in Ukraine. Finally, he adds that it would be very difficult to coerce North Korea due to its even greater diplomatic isolation.
He then switched to the situation in South Korea. After 1987, South Korea became a democracy and went immediately to the declaration of martial law by the then-president Yoon Suk Yeol. He believes that his entourage was constituted of mostly so-called yes men. Yoon Suk Yeol has invoked that the North Korean government helped leftists to destabilize the government of South Korea. According to him, the reaction of the South Korean population has been firmly against the misuse of martial law. Furthermore, the US Department of State has designated South Korea as a sensitive state. He also believes that Lee Jae-myung will likely be the next president of South Korea. This event has polarized the South Korean society and further frayed its democratic principles. Foreign actors such as China, Russia, and North Korea could use this exceptional situation to their advantage. Finally, Dr. Kym told us that the idea that South Korea would develop its own nuclear weapons has great popularity among the population due to North Korean provocation and the unpredictable Trump administration.
Overall, this conference was interesting, but it lacked some more details. It was very much for students unaware of the Korean peninsula's situation and its recent developments. The fact that Dr.Kym is of Korean origin adds credibility to his speech. This conference was one hour long during the lunch and learn program at the BSOG.

Europe in the age of American abandonment by Stanley Pignal 02.04.2025
Stanley Pignal is the head of the Brussels bureau of the newspaper The Economist. He was invited to express his impression on the new Trump administration and its consequences for Europe. He first explained that his demand that the new administration spend 2% of its GDP is not new. Still, the possible abandonment of defense in Europe is something new that would force the allies to find new opportunities. He was doubtful that EU countries could increase their spending on the defense sector due to the high level of Western European countries. Stanley Pignal claimed that the Trump administration does not want to respect international norms because it would hurt American interests. Given these circumstances, the EU constitutes a threat to American interests. He then emphasized the goal of Donald Trump to isolate China through a policy of containment.
Stanley Pignal emphasized three incidents that show the incompetence of the new American administration. The first incident was JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference. He was shocked by the speech's content, which did not address any of the security concerns of European NATO members. Instead, JD Vance criticized his own allies for supposedly failing to represent common values such as democracy and free speech by invoking several cases. The second event that has stunned him was the ambush of Trump and Vance of Zelensky. He considered it unacceptable and that it further weakened the US and NATO position in the Ukrainian conflict. An humiliation done to a country that fights for its survival clearly shows a bad signal vis-à-vis its allies. Furthermore, this event further emphasized that the USA is not a predictable ally. The third event is the leak of the discussion of a signal group that includes Pete Hegseth, JD Vance, Mike Waltz, and a journalist from The Atlantic. They discussed about crucial and sensitive information related to a future bombing of the Ansarallah group in Yemen. It reinforces Stanley Pignal's view of this administration's incompetence regarding the use of sensitive data and its misuse of technology.
He then explained that the main difference between the first and second Trump administrations was that he was not coerced anymore by the bureaucracy. He has managed to remove all officials who were not yes men. His second mandate would allow Trump not to have counterpowers that would diminish his power. Furthermore, he praised General de Gaulle's vision of France's security with its independence from the USA. However, Stanley Pignal did not understand that the French nuclear deterrence aims only to defend France and not the EU countries from an existential threat.
Finally, he emphasized the potential difficulties for EU indebted states to rearm. He, however, approved the EU announcement of 800 Billion Euros and mechanisms for indebted states to borrow money to ensure their own security by buying new weapons.
This one-hour conference was not the most interesting. Stanley Pignal was just complaining about the new administration and was very biased in his analysis. I do believe that his biases compromise his analysis.

What’s the future of the Middle East presented by Dr Koert Debeuf and mr Assaad al Achi, Syrian economist and civil society, 12.02.2025
During a one-hour session, Al Achi addressed Prof. Debeuf's questions about his overall vision on the conflict in Syria, the dramatic changes following the revolution that marked the end of the Assad regime, and the future of the country and the broader Middle East. A stimulating Q&A with the public followed. Mr. Al Achi began to explain his journey throughout the Syrian conflict. He began by introducing himself and where he was from in Syria. He then continues by explaining that he moved with his family to Qatar just before the beginning of the Syrian revolution and the civil war that followed. He then told us that he took a firm stance against the Assad regime, which has condemned him to exile outside of Syria. He, of course, expressed his relief when Bashar al-Assad left Syria for Russia. he could for the first go back to Damascus to see his family. He goes on to explain that he began to be involved in a civil society organization first in Turkey and then in Belgium. He is the executive officer of the NGO Baytna. The mission of the NGO is to strengthen Syrian civil society to create a new democratic Syria. This NGO promotes equal rights regardless of ethnic, religious, and sexual identities. It also supports social justice in an egalitarian and merit-based society. Furthermore, he advocates for enhancing social responsibility among Syrians and supports the central values of the Syrian uprising: freedom, dignity, and justice.
He then continues explaining how he sees a future post-Assad Syria with core elements. He sees the maintenance of the unity of Syria as critical for the country's future development. He sees agreement between the al-Sharaa faction and the Kurds from the YPG as critical to creating a sustainable government. He then pleaded for a sanction relief for Syria by the EU to allow the Syrian economy to develop. He believes that economic sanctions cannot allow economic development. If sanctions are not lifted, he fears that non-Western actors such as Russia would take advantage to regain their lost influence. He expects the EU to engage with the new provisional government to re-establish diplomatic relations. According to him, the EU should aim for the stability of Syria to allow Syrians to return from exile in Europe to rebuild the country. As of today, the Syrian economy and infrastructure do not allow great economic possibilities for the Syrian refugees to return. Finally, He advocates for the respect between ethnic and religious communities that have formed Syria. He believed that the EU should support ethnic and religious diversity in the new government to stop any sectarian movements from destabilizing Syria. He was also thankful that Belgium had a unique framework that allowed him and his associates to establish an NGO even though they were not residents of Belgium at that time.
I have found that Mr Al-Achi gives us great information about Syria from his own experience. I have appreciated this conference even though it sometimes lacks precise information. I understand that this conference was only one hour, and he could not cover everything

My part would evolve around the aspects of how Russia weaponizes its energy sector to implement the goals of its grand strategy. We will first present an overall aspect of how the occupation of Ukrainian land would impact the EU and US energy transition and disturb the supply line that the EU intends to create in order to diversify its mineral imports. The systemic destruction of the Ukrainian agriculture sector by Russia is done with the aim of consolidating Russia's dominant position in the global agriculture market. Secondly, Russia used its state-owned gas company to attain its ends by pressuring its customers to end the gas supply when a decision made by the customer country threatened Russia’s influence. The monopoly of Gazprom on pipelines emphasizes the long-term influence that it can have Russia on the downstream countries. Furthermore, Russia tends to attract Western energetic companies to invest in new gas fields and, thus, tie both Russian and Western businesses together. As an example, TOTAL invested in the group Novatek, provided them with LNG technology, and participated in the exploitation of other gas fields. Moreover, oil has been used by Russia as a means to accomplish its end goals. Russia is the second largest oil producer. It uses its oil revenue as a financial reserve to assure Russia of being able to sustain economic shocks such as sanction regimes. An interesting tactic that the Russian government has used is that the budget is calculated in relation to an oil barrel price of 40 USD. All superior revenues are automatically put into two Russian sovereign funds that constitute Russian financial reserves. It allows Russia to balance its budget when there is a deficit. Furthermore, Russia participates in the OPEC + dialogue to counter the US shale oil industries. Russia sees the diminution of oil production as a goal to maintain its revenue. Russia is also keen to develop infrastructure to export its oil, such as the north-south corridor that starts from Russia and ends in the Iranian ports along the coast of India. Finally, Russia uses its nuclear industry as a means to weaponize energy. The state-owned company Rosatom is a conglomerate that builds and exports its nuclear reactors everywhere in the world. Rosatom controls 40% of global uranium enrichment and is thus a dominant actor.. The construction of a reactor allows Russia to have a long-term influence on the targeted country. The USA and the EU are largely dependent on nuclear fuel made by Rosatom and thus help Rosatom to not be completely sanctioned. 30% of US nuclear fuel comes from Russia, and 40% of EU-enriched Uranium comes from Russia.

Russian Grand Strategy 10 March 25 - Présentation 

Executive Summary

• The EU must deepen its relationship with Greenland to secure minerals vital for its digital and green transition. The EU should ensure a supply chain that would allow it to avoid dependency on the USA or China. At the same time, Russia continues to constitute a destabilizing factor in the region. An upgrade of the EU system should be done to develop green land that has been neglected due to difficult access, rough climate, and harsh conditions.
• Access to these resources would be achieved through infrastructure development, foreign direct investment from EU countries, and improvement of the skills of the local Greenlandic workforce. Human capital development would be important to allow the local population to benefit from this new economic boom and not create anti-colonial and eurosceptic feelings. The development of an alternative EU law framework that includes ESG and tax breaks and the development of food security also constitute crucial elements to ensure EU access to these resources.

Context and Importance of the Problem
• Greenland’s critical geopolitical location is essential for controlling Arctic maritime routes and securing Europe's northern flank. This territory is situated on the American continental in the north-east of Canada and in the Northwest of Iceland. It has a territory of 2.1 million square kilometers, and 80% is under the ice. It is a Danish autonomous territory that strives for self-sufficiency and maybe a future independence from Denmark. Despite its population of only 56542 people, Greenland's location would be important in the confrontation between great powers such as China, Russia, and the USA(Leclerc 2025). Recent ice melting allows a new trade route and better accessibility for extracting natural resources. Greenland would be a key player in the future of international navigation and shipping due to its geography. Its land is situated between the Northwestern Passage and the Greenland,-Iceland,-United-Kingdom gap(GIUK). Greenland's economy has evolved around fisheries and limited tourism. Fishery represents 97,8% of total goods exports at a value of 516 million Euros ( Leclerc 2025). Furthermore, Denmark provides a grant to Greenland of 556 million euros and is, thus, heavily dependent on Denmark. Furthermore, the EU pays 17,26 million to gain access to the Island’s exclusive economic zone(EEZ). Also interesting to mention is that since 1982, an autonomous territory has left the EU, but its inhabitants have retained Danish citizenship, which makes them EU citizens. 2/3 of Greenlanders wish to become independent, but disagreements persist on how independence should be handled (Leclerc 2025).
It is worth noting that The US already possesses the Pituffik space base, and Greenland is a NATO member due to Denmark’s membership. A problem that could occur is the protection of its sovereignty due to low infrastructure development, harsh climate conditions, lack of population, attempt of annexation by the US and low economic development.
• Secondly, I will highlight Greenland's substantial deposits of rare earth minerals, crucial for the EU's green and digital transition and strategic autonomy. Nine out of the 14 minerals on Earth, as well as oil and uranium, lie in Greenland (Tomala 2017). Securing access to rare earth minerals has become crucial, and Greenland has largely untapped deposits in its soil. The lack of infrastructure has hampered its exploitation. To achieve Greenland's independence, there is a need to build a strong state structure and a strong economy independent from great powers and that could attract corporations. This is why the EU has signed a strategic partnership with Greenland to secure its rare earth supply( EU Courts Greenland for Critical Raw Materials Amid Arctic Geopolitical Shifts | Benchmark Source 2024). The EU strategic partnership seeks to build a supply chain for the EU and invest in infrastructures and extraction tools following ESG goals( European Union and Government of Greenland 2023). A problem that has emerged is that the EU has delegated infrastructure development for electricity, water, and communication to the mining company( European Union and Government of Greenland 2023). The EU seems to have chosen the minimum investment for the development of infrastructures that would only suit mining companies and not the development of Greenland’s economy. Difficulties in building infrastructures come from the polar climate and the fact that 80% of Greenland is covered by ice. Overall, the EU should encourage other ways of transport, such as roadways, for the sustainable development of Greenland’s economy.
• Thirdly, there is concerns over increased US and Chinese economic interests in Greenland, posing risks to the supply of EU rare earths. The interests of China in Greenland began in 2011 when the then-Chinese deputy prime minister had a meeting with the Greenlandic minister of resources industry for economic cooperation. Ex-Greenlandic prime minister K.Kleist came under pressure from the US, China, and the EU, and it has led to a grant of one hundred permits for exploiting natural resources. A good example of Chinese influence is the temporary emigration of 2000 Chinese workers to Greenland to extract iron ore for the British company London Mining, which sells its production in the Chinese market(Tomala 2017). Greenlandic population was very much against this policy, and it shows that there is a need for Greenland to allow their own population to be part of this exploitation. There will be a need to for skilled workers that would could handle mining jobs. Finally, relations with the EU had been a source of tension due to the difficulties of implementing the memorandum of understanding draft by the European Commission in 2012. However, this cooperation was perceived as too slow and bureaucratic by Nuuk, which has led to thesignature of a similar agreement with China that has put the EU on the back foot ( Tomala 2017). At the same time, the US is keen to expand its influence and is even ready to annex Greenland. Its main interest is in securing the rare earth supply chain and adding the additional presence of American soldiers in the region. The recent visits of the US Secretary of State JD Vance and Donald Trump Jr. have to be interpreted to push back Denmark's influence and, thus, EU's influence on this great territory(Viser 2025).
• Russia’s assertive territorial claims and military activities in the Arctic, stressing the urgency for an EU proactive strategy in Greenland. Since 2022, Greenland has supported sanctions against Russia and agrees on further militarization of its territory. In 2022, a new agreement for the implementation of the Arctic Capability package was signed by the Danish Minister of Defense and the Greenlandic Minister Vivian Motzfeldt( (Strandsbjerg 2023). Greenland's location is situated between the American continent and Russia. A consequence of climate change has been the opening of the Northern sea route that would drastically reduce the distance between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. Since the beginning of the war, there has been a rise in the so-called hybrid threats, and military build-up could lead to the destabilization of Greenland. The invasion of Ukraine has halted most dialogue between Russia and other Arctic member states and thus, created an unpredictable environment. In the arctic region, We can admittedly say there was a transition from a low tension zone to an arena where competition and mistrust are key components of the relations between Arctic members states and Russia( Leclerc, Gabija and European Parliamentary Research Service. 2025). The Pittufik space base constitutes a critical US installation that supports NATO missile defense and space surveillance systems. Modern military operations rely heavily on polar-orbiting satellites for various activities, including weather monitoring, communications, imaging, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as exploring navigation alternatives to GPS. Greenland's coordinates make it ideal for developing and managing those systems (Leclerc, Gabija, and European Parliamentary Research Service 2025). Furthermore, Greenland is situated within the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. It is an area of the northern Atlantic Ocean, forming a critical passage for vessels moving between the Atlantic and Arctic oceans. Controlling this strategic transit route allows NATO to monitor and regulate maritime traffic, ensure that essential sea lanes remain open and secure, and detect possible underwater and hybrid threats from Russia. The EU must maintain a strong position to contain an aggressive Russia.

Critique of Current EU-Greenland Strategy

• The EU's existing strategy lacks clarity, geopolitical foresight, and concrete commitments to safeguard Greenland's sovereignty. Greenland's sovereignty has been eroded due to the lack of maintaining a Danish identity among the Greenlanders. In 1982; Greenland has decided to leave the EU but remained an autonomous territory within Denmark( Tomala 2017). More Autonomy was added, which includes mineral resources (2010), occupational safety for offshore work in 2010), and determination of time in 2023(Leclerc, Gabija and European Parliamentary Research Service). This has led to the erosion of Denmark's influence on Nuuk authorities and allowed the possibility of non-EU countries such as the USA, China, and Russia to take advantage of this influence vacuum. Despite aggressive Trump’s rhetoric, Denmark has allowed discussions with the Trump administration to build discreet, confidential, or unofficial understandings with him to expand American activities in Greenland(Levitan 2025). Nuuk’s push for greater autonomy has raised concerns in the US, prompting warnings about potentially taking control of Greenland to prevent foreign interference and to control EU potential resources. These developments are likely to foster bilateral dialogue between the US and Denmark as a strategy to pressure Denmark to agree on more significant concessions to the US and fragment the EU-Greenland partnership on Critical minerals.

• The partnership signed between the EU and Greenland in 2023 represents an attempt by the EU to create a supply chain for intensifying the development of digital and green technologies. A report published in 2023 by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) recognized that 25 of the 34 minerals covered under the European Commission’s ‘critical raw materials’ were present in Greenland (“EU Courts Greenland for Critical Raw Materials Amid Arctic Geopolitical Shifts | benchmark Source” 2024). EU partnership lacks engagement when dealing with its strategic partnership with Greenland. The EU goals are somewhat vague. On the one hand, the EU Commission supports the mobilization of funding for the development of infrastructure for electricity, water, and communication for critical rare earth materials and other Raw Materials extraction, processing, and refining projects (European Union and Government of Greenland 2023). On the other hand, the EU does not consider infrastructure and economic development in a broader framework.

• Another measure absent from the EU strategy regarding Greenland is its lack of food sovereignty. Most of Greenland’s fresh food sources come from wild animals or fish. Greenland has a lamb production and a limited supply of vegetables, but most of the food produced is imported from outside. Imported foods provided 75-80% of the energy consumed by adult Greenlanders in 2013 (Exner-Pirot, H., B. Norbye and L. Butler 2018). This food is subsidized and can impede the development of Greenland and make it more vulnerable in case of an invasion. Greenlandic population could be subjected to low-quality imported food that could have a bad effect on the quality of life of Greenlandic people. Food is also considered a cultural symbol that should not be eroded.

 

 

 

Policy Recommendations for an Enhanced EU Grand Strategy

- A proposal could be the re-enforcement of the partnership between the EU and Greenland through the construction of infrastructures such as roads and airports to improve the economic development of Greenland. Furthermore, the EU will need to develop the skills of the Greenlandic population in relation to mining industries. It will create manpower corresponding to economic needs and ease budget aid from Denmark, which accounts for roughly half of the Greenlandic budget. The first step could be to develop chairs in Nuuk University in relation to the geologic and mining industries. Secondly, there is a need to connect major mining companies to new graduates with the goal of offering them jobs directly in Greenland and stopping Greenlandic brain drains. Due to the low population living in Greenland, Greenlandic citizens should be able to have primacy in work recruitment over foreigners due to the small numbers of individuals. Foreigners would only be slightly impacted because there would be a will to import foreign manpower to Greenland to extract minerals and build infrastructures. It would also add value at an institutional level. The EU must be able to tolerate the Greenlandic primacy rule because they are EU citizens, and it would be much easier to deal with Europeans than foreign manpower. Furthermore, the formation of a new Greenlandic working class would also affect their political institutions. Development of infrastructures does not only include physical infrastructures but also the human development part, which could be crucial in order to not foster eurosceptic feelings among the local population that could lead to other superpowers such as Russia, China, and the USA taking advantage of the EU.

- The EU should abandon its critical raw minerals because its stipulates that no more than 65% of EU imports should not come from a third party non-EU countries(Fabrikker 2025). Even though Greenland has left the EU, an exception should be applied because Greenlandics still possess Danish citizenship and are not entirely independent from Denmark.

- At the same time, the EU Commission should be able to bring EU laws on Greenland with the aim of developing the mining industries to the highest standard. Greenlandic population is very much attached to its environment and does not want their ancestral land to be polluted and see their historical environment being destroyed by mining companies. The implementation of European sustainable goals(ESG) may constitute a good framework to install a high international standard for environmental, social, and governance standards. Implementing these standards would increase the costs of extracting, but Greenland should be able to have massive tax advantages for EU mining companies only. This new law framework would allow fair competition between EU companies because they would have to respect ESG in order to benefit from tax breaks. ESG would allow the EU to set of regulations that would secure EU critical raw material supply needed for the green and digital transformation.

- Food sovereignty is a goal that allows Greenland to not be vulnerable to foreign food importations. First, food sovereignty would constitute economic relief for the Greenlandic government due to the subventions accorded to food products, reducing the economic burden on the local population. Second, it would also allow Denmark to diminish its aid directly given to the Greenlandic government. Greenlandic agricultural industry should receive significant support in the form of support for the establishment of new fields, purchase of new stables and irrigation systems, as well as a subsidy per livestock.

- The EU should strengthen its diplomatic presence in the Arctic by expanding its presence in Nuuk( that already exists) to other cities of Greenland to foster a link with the local population and to create an accurate link with the local population. In general. The EU Commission should implement its EU-Greenland partnership within its Arctic strategy to add EU credibility. The EU Commission should stress to the US its willingness to maintain an American presence to counter Russia and China but not to accept any attempt to buy or annex this autonomous territory of Denmark.

 

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